the cerebellum was a bicellular cyst, containing healthy pus. Each partition of the cyst was about large enough to contain a hazel-nut. In the lower part of the right posterior lobe of the cerebrum was a large loose clot of freshly extravasated blood, around which was a little substance of the blood-brain. The heart was large, and its walls were very thick. It weighed thirteen and a quarter ounces. The spleen contained several small blocks of fibrine. The rest of the viscera were healthy.

Remarks. The apoplectic clot discovered in this case probably had its origin to the atheromatosous condition of the cerebral vessels; whilst the abscess of the cerebellum might have owed its origin to injury produced by the accident above noticed. The cerebellum, however, has been much affected, for it is scarcely likely that so large an apoplectic clot should have existed any length of time without the occurrence of more or less paralysis. It did not appear, from inquiries strangers to the case, that the subject had been affected by the fall on her head; nor did she refer the chief pain at any time to the occipital region.

Original Communications.

LECTURE ON MORAL INSANITY.

By John Kitching, Esq., Medical Superintendent of the Retreat, New York.

We are in the habit of talking very glibly of the sane and the insane, as if these terms were universally understood, and as clear as the difference between sunshine and cloud. The terms are clear enough, but in the thing signified there is often a good deal of obscurity; otherwise we should not witness, as we sometimes do, the spectacle of learned people giving evidence on different sides, when a question involving the meaning of the terms is to be decided. And if this is the case amongst persons whose studies have led them to familiarity with these subjects, how can we expect that the public at large, from whom juries are selected, and who are necessarily almost strangers to the thing, should accept without reluctance or gain-saying, the conclusions which would embrace in the category of insanity what they have been accustomed to call by another name—whether it be vice, crime, oddity, eccentricity, impulsive, sullenness, irritability, wildness, electricity, passion, turpitude, or by whatever other name the thing before them may seem to them properly designated? It is a difficult thing to decide in many cases, and it is sure to come to be a difficult thing, if it were not so. Everything that raises a serious question in these days is a difficult thing, and ought to be. The age of easy things is past: ad majorem vocamus. Then, if we are surrounded by so many difficult things, and we battle with them with such terrible cleanness and deterrence, the difficulty out of them, let us also face this one additional difficulty of moral insanity, and calmly examine the subject with a view to the solution of the difficulty; not turning our backs upon it with a grin of angry ridicule; as if the foundations of society were going to be uprooted, and the flood-gates of impetuous crime let loose, because an unexpected interpretation may be put upon some notorious phase of character.

The study of all mental phenomena involves difficulties of great magnitude. The operations of mind are so various, that the attempt to discover the laws by which these are regulated has engaged the profoundest attention of the most gifted men; and the greatest metaphysicians, whose science concerns mind only in a state of health, have been brought to very opposite conclusions. When, however, we turn our attention to mind in a state of disorder, an additional source of complication and difficulty is introduced: and we may cease to wonder in the presence of so much that is obscure and arduous, that men who are practically conversant with insanity should not see eye to eye on the subtle points embraced in so complex a subject. If this be a correct position, let me ask, is it at all likely that those who have no acquaintance with the changes produced in mind by the insidious disease, should form correct conclusions respecting the phenomena of insanity as we think, therefore, there is nothing either unreasonable or arrogant in the assumption, that it is only those who have studied the blackest abscess of the mind end the malady in both its whole mental condition is changed. Instead of the calm flow of thought and feeling which characterise him in health, his ideas follow each other with rapidity; the operations of his mind are tumultuous; his feelings are impulsive; and his utterance is loud, rapid, and imperious: the physical system participates in the exaltation; the patient performs feats of strength to which he is at other times unequal; every thought, word, and action, suggests an ecstasy. Doubtless, he irremediably felt. It is as if every function of life had received an irresponsible accession of ardour and activity, and the whole economy, animal and intellectual, were carried on under high pressure. The man lives through the whirlwind of a week in a single day; and the process is therefore an exhausting one.

This form of insanity exists in many degrees. In its highest development it deprives the person entirely of his senses. He has no control whatever over his thoughts, words, and actions. The promptings of his brain have an absolute dominion over him. He is carried about by a mental whirlwind, which mingles in one confused jumble the rapidly generated and evanescent impulses, and breaks them up into fragments, so that there is little or nothing of continuity or coherence. The whole series of phenomena are the beginnings without middle or end; or associations lost and disconnected. But as often as a fresh idea is begun before the others have been followed out, a less degree of excitement allows a little more time for each suggestion; and as the urgency of the symptoms is abated, the incoherence and rapidity of all the actions is lessened till a condition is arrived at, which presents nothing more than a certain amount of ardour or excitement—not greater perhaps than that which is the natural state of a more sane person.

In this direction, then, we are led by gradual stages to the very confines of the disorder; and there is a “border land” of considerable breadth, which admits of doubt and hesitation sometimes, to which region it shall be consigned. With this, however, at present, we have nothing to do, and will pass therefore to the contemplation of another of those well marked forms, which at once dispel doubt, and convince the judgment.

It is the opposite of mania, and is named melancholia. This is by no means so simple a form as mania. It exists chiefly under two aspects—the active and the passive forms. In the former, the sensations are acute and the movement of the ideas rapid, but these are always of a painful and afflicting nature. Horror, remorse, fear, and apprehension, hang over the mind with an appalling, overwhelming canopy of darkness. If we trace the remedial efforts of the patient, we find him suffering, under which the moral and physical constitution trembles with undefined dismay. Sometimes the agony assumes a perceptible shape, and concentrates itself into an absorbing tear, a fainting fit, a temporary insensibility, caused by a fit of sleep, or by the half suppressed sigh, alone forms the outward sign of the worm that gnaws within; but gnaws so keenly, that the whole attention is riveted upon the working of his unseen teeth; and all the life is a prayer to the absorbing grief, to the general, all embracing, indefinite sorrow, paralysing resistance, annihilating exertion, wrenching up the entire being in a shroud of dismal and helpless inertia.

"Who art thou with anxious men.
Stealing o'er the shifting scene?
Eyes with tedious vigil bright,
Sighs by doubts and wishes bred,
Caution's steps and glaring fear,
The tears which flow-says Madman.
"

Like the state of exaltation previously described, this condition also goes through a wide range of degrees, varying from the most abstract of the mind and melancholy in both its whole mental condition, by a thin cloud, of the usual standard of healthy feeling. The next form of insanity to which I shall introduce you is

334
not necessarily accompanied by any exaltation or depression of the natural scale of the animal spirits. It consists in the derangement of the intellect, or a change in the reasoning powers of the mind, either to such an extent as to produce an entire absence of all power of thought, or of the power of preserving the reason in any rational direction. In the former case, the mental condition is charac-
terised as one of incoherence; in the latter, some idea or belief is generally entertained contrary to all sound reason. And, the term delusion is applied to it. When the mind is in a state of incoherence, it is impossible to converse for a few seconds with the patient without becoming aware of his condition. If he addresses you as the King of Spain, and tells you he saved you some money in his state, and you are in his hands, you may, at a moment, conceive his idea to be a delusion; but as soon as he is in a state of reason, you must not allow your ideas to be so easily swayed.

These examples of delusion are sufficient to illustrate this kind of disorder. They show that the mind may be affected with insanity which at first sight seems partial, and confined to some special subjects, and on this account the kind of insanity now spoken of was distinguished by the name of monomania; mania on a single point. The term monomania is now, however, but little used.

The three forms of insanity which we have now reviewed are those which afford the most conspicuous symptoms, and which are generally conceived by the popular mind as types of the disorder, when a person is said to be insane. They present broad and distinctive marks of departure from soundness of mind which are satisfactory and convincing. When a man is seen raving and violent, unable to control his words or guide his actions; or when he is seen brooding over some imaginary sorrow, neglecting every duty of life, and delivering himself to the sway of causeless terror, or rapt in vague abstraction; or when he utters some opinion grossly at variance with the general perceptions and common sense of mankind; or when his discourse is a jargon of unconnected words, the world is satisfied that he is insane. The justice of the verdict is accepted, his insanity accords with the popular notion of a mental delusion, and the judgment of all approves what belies the prejudices of none.

We have, however, by no means exhausted the wide field over which the manifestations of insanity are displayed. We have, for instance, taken the mind, as it were, in its totality, and have viewed it under the influence of certain disturbing forces which place it in a condition of disorder, as a storm of wind may sweep an entire ocean, and produce wild confusion and turbulence where there is no probable cause for the disorder. It is evident that a gale which shall blow over one region, within circumscribed limits, and leave the rest in entire or comparative calm. This somewhat coarse simile may serve as an illustration of what I wish to substantiate in the following part of my discourse.

We are all conscious in our own minds of the possession of many distinct faculties, and of our power of carrying on mental processes of the most refined kinds. When we are following out in the pages of Adams or Le Verrier one of the grand mathematical problems by which they forced the solar system to reveal to the astronomical world its long hidden orb of Neptune, and taught the exact spot in the heavens where the remote planet might be seen; and when, filled with admiration at the reach of the human intellect, we turn and bend in humble adoration of that Great Tribunal by which we are to be judged, then we may be enabled to appreciate the difference between the two mental operations we then perform! We are sensible of the distinctness between the faculties by which the two acts are accomplished, and that they belong to two distinct orders of psychical powers. In the one, the reasoning power is tasked to its utmost stretch. In the other, the reasoning power performs the smallest share. When we are surrounded by the creations of some bewitching poet, and ravelling passively in the charms of a Milton’s or a Shakespeare’s fancies, how differently we are employed, what a totally distinct set of mental faculties are we calling into operation from those we use when, stung by the taunts of an enemy, or roused by the opposition of an antagonist, we burn with anger or glow with a desire to retaliate! When fondly consorting with a childlike glee in their young sports, for the love of seeing them happy, what different beings we are, in so far as regards mental phenomena, from the scheming, plodding, acquisitive creatures we exhibit ourselves when toiling to win from the world the wealth that is to be bestowed upon their support.

Now, if we analyse the mental phenomena concerned in the very few and every day modes to which I have just adverted, we shall find that the powers brought into operation are referrible to two distinct orders; and it is convenient to designate these as the thought, and the moral faculties. All those powers of the mind by which we maintain our existence as rational creatures, which enable us to cultivate science and art, to invent, discover, and apply, to reason, to compare, and to conceive in general, to remember objects, and to enemies with the help of reason, to translate ideas into words, and to reason about the forces and powers, and would make a rational being if we were possessed of no other powers besides. But we feel that we have other
powers. We feel that we have affections which render us kindly disposed to each other; that prompt us to love our friends, our children, and all others who love us; and the wants of those who are about us; that lead us to desire the good opinion of others, or to entertain a good opinion of ourselves; that incite us to a reverential feeling towards our Country, in the discharge of our own will. On the other hand, that we have faculties which render us eager in opposing anything which we dislike, which make us triumph in the surmounting of difficulties, and resolute in the battle against want; or, if we might say, bathe in the notions which lead us to take every care for the preservation of our lives, and the satisfaction of our bodily wants. These various powers and faculties, as it were, distinct from the former set, are conveniently designated by the terms "moral and instinctive faculties." They are called moral, because they proceed over the regulation of our conduct towards others, and determine our sentiments and affections. Now, it needs no discussion to establish the proposition, that men differ very widely in the amount of these intellectual faculties. So universally is this difference recognised, that we have no common phrases in the language than those used to denote the differences between men in this respect. And not only do they differ in the aggregate amount of their intellectual ability, but they differ very greatly in the power of particular faculties; and grown up men scarcely differ in these respects more than boys and children. This shows that the difference is not entirely acquired, but is innate. One boy displays an aptitude for argumentation; another, for the accumulation of facts; a third, for the composition of verses; a fourth, a talent for philosophy; a fifth, for the construction of machinery; a sixth, for the discovery of new relations between the things he observes; and so on in almost endless variety: and, as boys grow into men, we have the intellectual world peopled with statesmen, philosophers, logicians, grammarians, orators, poets, and artists; and these all of every possible grade of intellectual power and excellence.

In the same way that it admits of no dispute that the intellect offers these varieties of power, we may observe again a difference in the relative manifestation of the intellectual faculties, as compared with the other order of faculties, which I have just called the moral faculties. A man may have intellectual abilities of the first order, and yet be deficient in those qualities which go to the composition of a good subject in his social, domestic, and moral relations. These latter faculties do not appear to hold any definite relation to the development or strength of the former. The circle of our own acquaintance may supply us with examples of men conspicuous for the zeal and success with which they cultivate science, commerce, or the arts, or the ability with which they follow out any favourite pursuit, who are, nevertheless, greatly deficient in those moral perceptions and sensibilities which are necessary for the formation of a great and useful character. How many there are in the history of literature and science whose powers have been disturbed by the unregulated ambition and unscrupulous desire of clever and gifted men, in whom Nature has been enabled to make great discoveries or inventions, and who, still unaccompanied by the controlling and humanising faculties of an equally powerful moral constitution. Had the moral faculties of such men been equal to their intellectual powers, would the history of Ennius, or Cato, or the bard of the Iliad, or of Lysimachus, or of Nicias, have been written. Instead of being traced with a pen dipped in blood, and guided by the light of a thousand fires of sacked and burning villages and towns, inspired by the drum of war and the thunder of cannon, it would have beamed with the light of love to human kind, and would have formed, each in its time, an epoch in the advancement of the human race in the arts of civilisation, literature, commerce, and peace.

If we find, on the one hand, that great mental endowment may be consistent with a deficiency in the moral powers and affections; we also find that these latter not unfrequently coexist with a very moderate scale of intellectual development. We see a man exercising all the offices of a good citizen, of a kind husband and tender parent, full of good works and benefactions to his neighbours, bending towards his enemies, anxious to promote the welfare of all around him, increasing the amount of happiness within the whole circle of his influence, however unlearned he may be, if we consider the want of abilities necessary to excel in the want of abilities for their attainment, that man still possesses talents and powers, which, though of a very different order from those which we style intellectual, are no less purely physical faculties, which the merely intellectual man does not possess, and which lead him to a sphere of action in which the other could no more supplant him than he could rival the other in the artifices of his art. This diversity in the relative prominence of the two orders of faculties towards each other, admits, I think, of no kind of doubt. We must unhesitatingly grant that there is a difference between the intellectual capabilities of one man and those of another, or as that between the strength of one man's muscles and bones, or the size of his corporeal frame, from those of another. A phrenologist, attending only to the difference in the size of some part of his head or brain, shall have something to say on this by and by. At present I wish to establish the fact on common experience and observation. We shall arrive at the truth by these methods, with as much certainty and clearness as if we endeavoured to establish it by arguments not so generally understood, and much more open to debate. The concession, then, of a discrepancy between the intellectual and moral faculties of individual, and between the intellectual and moral faculties of the same individual, leads us to the subject of the difference between the moral faculties of one individual and those of another. Shall we question the existence of such a difference? Shall we say that if children and boys are gifted with various degrees of intellectual ability, they are all equally endowed in this respect, and that the differences afterwards exhibited are due to the comparative success or failure of education or training? to the operation of the multifarious agencies, favourable or unfavourable, to which the individual has been subjected in his youth? of St. Giles and St. James? No doubt of the vast influence of these agencies. No doubt of the substantial truthfulness of Hogarth's masterly design in the subsequent foibles and follies of the child. For it is indisputable, that "as the twig is bent, so is the tree's inclined." But is this all? Is there no difference in the original quality and innate property of the twig? Will the fathers and mothers whether there is not a great original difference in their children in these respects? Is there in all your children alike the same affectionateness of disposition? Is there the same degree of kindness towards brothers and sisters? Is there in all of them an equal degree of calm and placid good temper? Do you find it equally easy to instil into all your young and tender minds the love of truth, ready obedience to orders, the forgiveness of offences, the virtue of self-denial? Can you teach them all equally the subjugation of their young passions? Are not some among them much more impetuous, rashable, vain, proud, resentful, disobedient, sensual, avaricious, and mischievous, than the rest? And are not these differences of character manifested before they can be the result of any external influences? Are we not satisfied by the irresistible convictions of our experience, that these are innate in the constitution of the children, and are also quite independent of their intellectual abilities? How often, indeed, it happens, that the brightest sparks of intellectual ability in some children, are marked as the signs of an unripe moral constitution! How often it happens that the one who shines the least in this direction, is redeemed by the compensating gifts of a sweet temper and an amiable mind, and mitigates the defects of his deficiencies by some grace of a very essential moral nature? Thus we had the history of the child of the haymakers, with the talents of the Cesar or of a Nicias, to teach the rest, to be the solace and comfort of her family, possibly much in need of them from the wildness and errors of that one whose intellectual endowments apparently fitted him to be their pride and ornament. If these differences exist in children before the influence of external impressions can have produced them, they must obviously be considered inherent qualities which will show a tendency to persist during the remainder of life. They grow with the advance of years, and become more and more conspicuous as the sphere for their manifestation enlarges. Education may do very much for the individual towards the development of these inclinations of religion may do more; but the radical cause of the difference is still there; and education must greatly extend its scope, and widen the objects at which it aims, before it can tend to produce a tree that will produce the "good fruit." Thistles will not yield figs, nor brambles grapes. The axe must be laid to the root of the tree, and it must either be prevented from bearing fruit, or the amelioration of the root from or literary education must be so great, that a gradual improvement may be accomplished in each succeeding generation, before any grand result will be realised.

[To be continued.]